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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, J 
Plaintiff-Respondent, J 
V Case No. 
v
* / 14000 
W I L L SAVAGE, V 
Defendant-Appellant. I 
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction on a charge of 
loitering in violation of Section 32-1-17(5) Salt Lake 
City Ordinances, as amended in 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of loitering in Salt Lake 
City Court, Judge Grant presiding. The decision was 
affirmed on appeal in the Third District Court of Utah, 
Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding. A Motion to 
Dismiss on constitutional grounds was heard by that 
court and overruled. 
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R E L I E F SOUGHT ON A P P E A L 
Respondents ask the Court to uphold the trial 
court's ruling that Section 32-1-17(5), Revised Ordin-
ances of Salt Lake City, as amended in 1973, is consti-
tutional and a valid exercise of the police power. 
I S S U E P R E S E N T E D F O R R E V I E W 
The sole issue presented for review is whether or 
not Section 32-1-17(5), Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, is a constitutional exercise of the Police 
Power. 
STATEMENT O F T H E CASE 
Two Salt Lake City Police Officers who were 
working a second job as security officers for the Tri-Arc 
Travel Lodge in downtown Salt Lake City, observed 
the Appellant circling the hotel in a motor vehicle. Be-
cause the hotel, during the four (4) nights previous to 
this incident had had 28 rooms broken into by a person 
using channel lock pliers, the officers requested a license 
check. They were informed that the automobile was 
registered to Joe Van, who was considered armed and 
dangerous, and known to carry a weapon in his vehicle 
or on his person at all times. This occurred about 3:00 
a.m. At approximately 3:25 a.m. the officers noted the 
vehicle backed into a hotel parking space thirty (30) 
feet from the stairway exit. The driver was not in the 
vehicle. One officer remained to watch the car while 
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the other officer entered the hotel to investigate. He 
observed Appellant wearing gloves and on the second 
floor of the hotel. When Appellant saw the officer he 
purchased a coke from the coke machine and returned to 
his car. The officer followed, searched him for weapons 
calling him Joe Van. At that point the Defendant stated 
he was not Joe Van and one of the officers then noted 
he wore a wig. This was removed and they recognized 
the Appellant. They asked Appellant for an explanation 
of his conduct and was told that he had entered the 
hotel to buy a coke and meet a woman (who never did 
appear). After arresting the Defendant for loitering the 
officers found channel lock pliers on the floor-board of 
his vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BURDEN OF SHOWING UNCON-
STITUTIONALITY LIES WITH THE APPEL-
LANT. 
Section 10-8-49, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, dele-
gates to a City the authority to enact Ordinances deal-
ing with vagrants, mendicants and persons wandering 
about without lawful purpose. Pursuant to this author-
ity, Salt Lake City passed into law Section 32-1-17 of 
the City Ordinances. This Ordinance defines and pro-
scribes loitering with ten (10) different Subsections so 
as to be as precise as possible. Appellant was charged 
3 
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under section 32-1-17—Loitering. This ordinance pro-
vides it shall be unlawful for any person to loiter in Salt 
Lake City. A person is guilty of loitering when he: 
(5) "Loiters, remains or wanders in or about 
a building, lot, street, sidewalk, or any other pub-
lic or private place without apparent reason and 
under circumstances which justify suspicion that 
he may be engaged in or about to engage in a 
crime, and: 
"(a) upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses 
to identify himself by name and address; or 
"(b) after having given his name and address 
by inquiry of a peace officer refuses or fails to 
give a reasonably credible account of his con-
duct and purpose; or 
( 6 ) . . . " 
This ordinance is now being challenged by Appel-
lant, as unconstitutional. In reviewing a Statute on 
these grounds, certain rules of construction are applic-
able. A Statute or Legislative enactment is presumed 
to be valid and in conformity with the Constitution and 
should not be overturned unless it is shown, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, to be incompatible with some pro-
vision thereunder. Norville v. State Tax Commission 
(1940), 98 U. 170, 97 P.2d 937. The whole burden lies 
on him who challenges the constitutionality of a legis-
lative enactment. State v. Packer Corporation, 77 Utah 
500, 297 P.1013. 
Mr. Justice Washington of the Supreme Court of 
4 
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the United States explained the policy underlying this 
presumption in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 213, 
6 L.Ed. 606, at page 625 of L.Ed.; he stated: 
"It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, 
the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative 
body by which any law is passed to presume in 
favor of its validity until its violation of the Con-
stitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt." 
Nor will the Court consider mere questions of 
policy or expediency when reviewing a Statute chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds. These are matters of 
legislation and belong to the Legislative Department. 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, (1917), 50 Utah 
114, 167 P . 241. This court has specifically stated: 
"It is recognized that statutes should not be 
declared unconstitutional if there is any reason-
able basis upon which they may be sustained as 
falling within the constitutional framework . . . 
a statute will not be void for uncertainty if any 
sort of sensible, practical effect may be given it." 
State t). Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561, 
at 563. 
The Ordinance in question was enacted pursuant 
to authority delegated to the municipality by the Legis-
lature, and springs from the police power. This is a 
power inherent in the State, to safeguard the general 
welfare of the community. Laws passed pursuant to 
this power are purely local in nature and sensitive to the 
particular needs of the people. The rule as to judicial 
5 
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interference with legislative enactments pursuant to the 
police powers is as follows: 
"The act must be upheld and enforced unless 
it manifestly bears no relation to public health, 
morals, welfare, or other legitimate opject of the 
police power, or, if it does bear such relation, un-
less it is a plain invasion of constitutional rights/* 
State v. Packer Corporation, 77 Utah 500, 297 
P. 1013, at 1016 (1931). 
In City of Seattle v. Drew (1967), 70 Wash. 2d 
405, 423 P.2d 522, the Washington Supreme Court 
stated: 
"The importance of loitering ordinances can-
not be minimized. They are necessary for the 
protection of society and for the preservation of 
the public peace." 
The Ordinance certainly bears a relationship to the 
public welfare. It is a legitimate exercise of the police 
power delegated to the City, and the means adopted to 
accomplish its purpose are reasonably appropriate to 
that purpose. As such it should be indulged a strong 
presumption of validity when reviewed. 
POINT I I 
THE SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCES 
ON LOITERING COMPLIES WITH THE 
NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS. 
Due process requires that a statute give fair warn-
6 
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ing of the conduct to be made a crime. In U.S. v. 
Harriss (1953), 347 U.S. 612 at 617, 98 L.Ed. 989, 
the Supreme Court said: 
"The constitutional requirement of definiteness 
is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the sta-
tute. The underlying principle is that no man 
shall be held criminally responsible for conduct 
which he could not reasonably understand to be 
proscribed. 
The above standard has been further defined in 
other court opinions. In Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 
1 L.Ed. 2d 1498, 77 S.Ct. 1304. 
"This Court, however, has consistently held 
that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the 
requirements of due process/ . . . [T]he Constitu-
tion does not require impossible standards'; all 
that is required is that the language 'conveys suf-
ficiently definite warning as to the proscribed 
conduct when measured by common understand-
ing and practices . . / " 
The court stressed that the notice required is to be 
judged in terms of "common understanding and prac-
tice" since absolute precision is impossible. The Arizona 
Supreme Court interpreted this standard in Barbone v. 
Superior Court of Pima County (1969); 11 A. App. 
152, 462 P.2d 845. 
"Courts, however, require only that a statute 
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give fair warning of the proscribed conduct i.e. 
the language does not have to achieve that degree 
of exactness which inheres in a mathematical 
theorum, but is sufficient if it informs a person 
of ordinary or average intelligence of the pro-
hibited conduct/' at p. 847, Pacific Reporter, 
(emphasis courts) 
"In determining the degree of certainty re-
quired by due process, courts should take into 
account the legislature's difficulty in expressing 
particular concepts/' at 849, Pacific Reporter. 
California's Supreme Court stated the matter 
thusly, 
"It should be kept in mind that there are in-
finite variety of activities or conduct which could 
result in potential or actual danger to, the 'peace, 
health, safety, convenience, good morals, and 
general welfare' of the public. A municipality 
cannot reasonably be expected to isolate and 
specify those precise activities or conduct which 
are intended to be proscribed." Sunset Amuse-
ment Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners of 
L.A. (1972), 101 Cal. R. 768, 496 P.2d 840 at 
845. 
And in People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 
748, 752, 92 P.2d 1039, 1042 : 
"To make a statute sufficiently certain to com-
ply with constitutional requirements, it is not 
necessary that it furnish detailed plans and speci-
fications of the acts or conduct prohibited." 
8 
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Section 32-1-17(5) Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, 1953, is precise and gives fair warning that 
the conduct prohibited is that which (1) gives the ap-
pearance the person has no lawful business in an area 
and (2) that his manner of occupying his time is such 
that it looks as though he is engaged in or about to 
engage in a crime. 
POINT I I I 
THE ORDINANCE IS A VALID EXER-
CISE OF POLICE POWER BECAUSE IT 
PUNISHES CONDUCT AND NOT STATUS. 
The mere presence of a person on a street or private 
place does not give rise to the offense. As the Wash-
ington Supreme Court stated in City of Seattle t>. Drew, 
70 Wash. 2d 405, 423 P.2d 522; 
". . . the right of a law enforcement officer to in-
quire of persons wandering abroad at night is 
limited to those persons whose conduct gives the 
officer reason for alarm that they are engaged 
in unlawful activity/* (emphasis courts) 
The Ordinance in question requires conduct to be 
evidenced before an officer may approach that person. 
It is not the failure to give a good account which is 
punishable. It is the conduct that may be punished. 
The purpose of "good account" is to assure the suspect 
a chance to explain away the circumstances which ap-
pear inculpatory rather than to punish silence. 
9 
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In the case of State v. Zito, 103 N.J . Super. 552, 
248 A.2d 254, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld 
a previous decision and stated that provisions for "good 
account'' are associated with conduct and that it was 
conduct which is punishable, not failing to give a good 
account. In that case the Court upheld an Ordinance 
which provided that an apprehended person who could 
not give a good account of himself was a disorderly 
person. 
Ricks v. U.S., 228 A.2d 316, involved a Narcotics 
vagrancy ordinance defining a vagrant as a known nar-
cotic user who had no lawful employment and who 
failed to give a good account of his presence for loiter-
ing in a public place. The Court upheld the Statute 
stating the term "loitering" was not vague and that the 
failure to give a good account restricted rather than 
enlarged the application of the statute. 
Oregon upheld an ordinance prohibiting the pres-
ence of a person during the hours of 1:00 a.m. to 4:00 
a.m. who could not give a good account of himself. In 
the case of Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Or. 409, 210 
P.2d 577, the court stated the offense was not failing 
to give a good account, but the offense was the volun-
tary conduct which overcame the presumed innocence 
of his movements. 
That is the situation in this case. Appellant's vol-
untary conduct overcame the presumed innocence of 
10 
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his movements. The officers did give Appellant an op-
portunity to explain away circumstances that appeared 
inculpatory, but the explanation not only failed to sat-
isfy the officers, it failed to satisfy Judge Grant and 
Judge Baldwin, both of whom found the Appellant 
guilty of loitering. 
The Appellant, in his Brief, cites the Model Penal 
Code as a model draft and he points out it was upheld 
in Florida as a valid exercise of power. As stated in 
Judge BreiteFs dissent in People v. Berck, 32 N.Y. 2d 
567, 347 N. Y.S. 2d 33, 300 N.E. 2d 411, cert, denied 
U.S. 38 L.Ed. 2d 500, 94 S.Ct. 724: 
"True, the majority points to the draft of a 
similar provision in the A.L.I. Model Penal 
Code (§250.6), which, to be sure, has added 
words, but none that are not embraced in the 
language of the instant statute . . . I would prefer 
the more detailed language of the Model Penal 
Code but I have difficulty in seeing that the de-
tail goes beyond the encompassing language of 
the instant statute." 
In the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed. 
2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 868, two men, during daylight hours, 
were observed appearing to "case" a store for a robbery. 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of the police 
officer to investigate the men, frisk them for weapons, 
and charge them with carrying concealed weapons. The 
men were charged for no offense other than carrying 
concealed weapons. I t is interesting to note that Mr. 
11 
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Justice Douglas, in his dissent, stated: "the opinion of 
the court disclaims the existence of probable cause'. 
If loitering were in issue and that was the offense 
charged, there would be 'probable cause9 shown!' (em-
phasis added) 
CONCLUSION 
The ordinance is a constitutional exercise of the 
police power because it prohibits conduct which under 
the circumstances justify suspicion that the person is en-
gaged in a crime or about to engage in a crime. The Or-
dinance does not require a person to justify himself but 
it restricts the application of the Ordinance by allowing 
the suspect to explain away the circumstances which ap-
pear inculpatory. As is implied strongly in Justice Doug-
las' dissent in Terry, loitering is a valid legitimate exer-
cise of police power and probable cause for arrest for 
loitering exists when one does act in such a manner as to 
make it appear under the circumstances that one is 
about to engage in a crime. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
GREG R. HAWKINS 
Assistant City Attorney 
101 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plain tiff-Respondent 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LAV/IlJRARY 
0/, F£'D 1S7S 
swm YOUUG w:rr.*-iry 
J. K.r-'-c-r Clc-k L-: • i, d 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
